	FILED
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA-M. NOV 1 6 2011
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAT
3	SANDRA K MARKHAM, Clerk By:
4	STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,) 01700 -
6	vs.) Case No. 20080-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DeMOCKER,)
8	Defendant.)
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14	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE WARREN R. DARROW
16	STATUS CONFERENCE/ORAL ARGUMENT
17	JULY 9, 2010
18	Prescott, Arizona
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24	REPORTED BY
25	MINA G. HUNT AZ CR NO. 50619 CA CSR NO. 8335

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1	Proceedings had before the Honorable
2	WARREN R. DARROW, Judge, taken on Friday, July 9,
3	2010, at Yavapai County Superior Court, Division 6,
4	120 South Cortez, Prescott, Arizona, before Mina G.
5	Hunt, Certified Reporter within and for the State of
6	Arizona.
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PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: This is CR 20080-1339, state versus Steven Carroll DeMocker, who is present with his attorneys, Mr. Sears, Mr. Hammond and Ms. Chapman. The state is represented by Mr. Butner and Mr. Paupore.

This was the time set for status conference regarding my review of the record in this case to make findings under Rule 19.5. Also consideration of various motions to the extent I can at this point. And there could be a limitation on my ability to do that, especially with disclosure issues.

I realize having read the information that I've just received in the last, well, basically, this morning for me -- I read what I can and -- I've actually read everything that's come in except for the state's response to the motion for reexamination of conditions of release. I just saw that right now. And then also exhibits were attached to the state's supplement for the motion to extent time. I've just gotten those exhibits a few minutes ago.

I need to -- I believe I need to look at the rulings that Judge Lindberg made dealing with other issues regarding disclosure on various issues

at various times to really be able to deal with that in any depth.

I have in mind some things I want to address. But under these circumstances I want to ask the attorneys first if there is anything pressing or anything anyone believes should be taken up at the outset. I'll do that first.

Mr. Butner?

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MR. BUTNER: Judge, I guess we could discuss the defendant's motion for reexamination of conditions of release. I think -- is the Court prepared to deal with that kind of an issue? brought with us a representative from the sheriff's office -- Captain Rhodes -- who can explain how the defendant's visitation circumstances have been modified so that he can have regular visitation. We thought we should get that before the Court so the Court had an understanding of that, that the modification was made to accommodate the new trial schedule of four days a week and make sure that the defendant could have visitation on a regular basis during that kind of a trial schedule.

And then we can litigate the other issues, I think, when the Court feels comfortable doing that, when the Court has had an opportunity to review, I guess, really what amounts to a rather significant amount of material provided to the Court that substantiates in a factual basis the state's request for the extension to use this additional evidence.

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THE COURT: I think that we can take up the issue to some extent. I want to say that I'm very conscious of that as talking to the jurors on Wednesday, talking about trial days. And I think Mr. Sears wanting to use the two days in the week, being conscious of the fact that now there is significant increase in the anticipated length of trial, everyone here is very cognizant of the presumption of innocence and what that means to have the trial just go on.

And it's not a light decision to say this date might not be available, this week might not be available. I think all of us are conscious of that.

I think part of my ability to make a meaningful ruling, though, on this issue relates to a lot of work and familiarity with the entire background of the case too.

But let's start with what you brought up, Mr. Butner, with regard to modifying the conditions

as they are now in terms of visitation.

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Mr. Sears, have you had a chance to talk to Mr. Butner about this and proposed changes that he's mentioned?

MR. SEARS: No, Your Honor. The first we knew of that was in the brief response that you said you've seen but haven't had a chance to read. The first reference to changes in visitation that we knew about came in in this pleading. And assuming that's what Captain Rhodes would say, I don't know that we need to have him simply repeat what it is.

But the circumstances is that the prior accommodation for Mr. DeMocker given the previous trial schedule was that he could have visitation every other Tuesday. We were only going to be in court every other Tuesday. So on those Tuesdays we were not in court, the sheriff would change his visitation, his otherwise visitation, which was always going to be on a trial date to that date.

And so this new proposal that he would have visitation from 7:30 to 9:00 every Monday through the remainder of the case. And assuming that's what Captain Rhodes would say, we'll accept that at face value if that's their proposal now.

THE COURT: Is that the --

MR. BUTNER: Just to make it completely clear, as Captain Rhodes points out to me, that's 7:30 to 9:00 a.m.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTNER: And that's every Monday.

THE COURT: Then that's going to happen in that regard at this point in any event.

MR. SEARS: It would appear so. What we wanted to talk about in terms of release conditions really bore more on the new trial schedule and the length of trial. The question of how the new trial schedule would impact visitation is part of what we wanted to talk about. Certainly more that I think is relevant. Certainly happy to do that now.

THE COURT: I don't want to take that up right now. I want to have more familiarity with the case before I do that. I have read the motion and obviously the response, the other information as well. I don't want to go any further into that today.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, we have otherwise scheduled today motions relating to some disclosure. The state has now filed a 69th supplemental and last night filed a 70th supplemental disclosure, which obviously could not

be part of our motion. But it relates in some respect to the matters that are in the 69th supplemental disclosure. And am I hearing you also that you want some additional time before we take that up?

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THE COURT: There are parts of this I want to address now with regard to the disclosure. I want to address anything that facilitates resuming the trial. That's what I want to address. Some of these things -- again, I think it's very important to address release conditions as soon as I meaningfully can.

But there are some matters in here that I think need to be discussed right away. And foremost in my mind anyway is some concern about Mr. Sears once again being a witness. It seems that's really something that's being urged. That needs to be talked about before we go any further.

What I saw in the record I have reviewed is there was an issue before regarding the email that came up.

MR. SEARS: The golf head cover.

THE COURT: Yeah. Right. It involved that.

And now there is one with something heard through the vent or something like that.

1 MR. SEARS: If I could give you a quick 2 overview. 3 THE COURT: Do you agree, Counsel, we should take that up? 4 5 Mr. Butner? 6 MR. BUTNER: I think that would be appropriate, 7 Judge, but there is other -- we have now established -- bear in mind, Judge, we're not on a 8 mission to make Mr. Sears a witness in this case. 10 That's not what is going on here. 11 What has happened is things have come up or rulings have been made by the Court that 12 13 necessitate Mr. Sears being made a witness. And one 14 of them is this email ruling which we're going to 15 ask this court to reconsider. And Judge Lindberg left the door open for that. 16 17 The email was ruled to be admissible, at 18 least on a tentative basis, this being an anonymous email. And I don't know if the Court is 19 20 sufficiently familiar with the that particular aspect of the case. 21 22

THE COURT: I have background in that. I know exactly what you're talking about.

MR. BUTNER: Well, prior to the anonymous email, Mr. Sears received information from his

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client, which was disclosed to the state, that approximately -- and I'm thinking it was, like, 30 days prior to the anonymous email. Mr. DeMocker while in the jail had received information from a voice in the vent, so to speak.

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And that would be a communication from an adjacent cell through the vent system in the jail that this person on the other end of this vent was familiar with the circumstances of how Carol Kennedy was killed and that she was killed by these guys in a prescription drug ring and that it was somehow connected to James Knapp. That's the gist of what this communication was about.

Mr. Sears received that information. And who knows what he was doing with it at that point in time. But then approximately 30 days later this anonymous email comes in directed to Mr. Sears and apparently was being attempted to be sent to me.

And it came from an internet cafe in Phoenix. But we didn't know that at the outset, of course. That was the subject of significant investigation by the Yavapai County Attorney's Office.

The email was provided by Mr. Sears to the Yavapai County Attorney's Office approximately three weeks after he received it. And then Mr. DeMocker

consented to an interview and came to the Yavapai County Attorney's Office and was interviewed by investigators -- and I was present at this interview -- concerning this email and then the voice in the vent also.

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And when the Judge ruled that the email was going to be admissible in this case, it made this information that had previously been provided to Mr. DeMocker and Mr. Sears highly relevant because, basically, it was the same story that was reiterated in the email.

And it also, then, made these cell block members in the jail that were in close proximity to Mr. DeMocker potential witnesses at that point in time once the Court made the ruling about the email.

And so that's what gave rise to the state filing another disclosure saying here we've got a bunch of these people that are witnesses, and Mr. Sears is also a witness again. But there is also an additional reason why Mr. Sears may be a witness in this case. And that's because he was the notary public on disclaimers of insurance proceeds that were filed with The Hartford life insurance company to obtain payment of the \$750,000 in life

insurance proceeds on Virginia Carol Kennedy's life. And what happened with those life insurance proceeds is they were processed. One of them went through --

THE COURT: I read your chronology that you had in your pleading.

MR. BUTNER: Okay. Well, then you, basically, know what happened. And that's what Exhibit A is about, what happened with those monies from those proceeds. They were processed through a testamentary trust and through the estate. And in one instance they went through the account of Katie DeMocker. And in the other instance they went directly through the account of Steven DeMocker after going through the estate and testamentary trust.

They were then transferred to Steven

DeMocker's mother's account, and then they were then transferred back to Mr. Sears and Osborn Maledon law firm, all of this in a very fast amount of time.

Wire transfers and things of that nature. Except for two checks.

The long and short of it being that

Mr. Sears is also a witness in that particular chain

of events as a result of notarizing the disclaimers

that were signed by Mr. DeMocker, and all of this being, basically, a distribution of life insurance proceeds that had been previously withheld by Hartford life insurance company on the basis that Mr. DeMocker was a suspect, was part of the investigation of the homicide of Virginia Carol Kennedy.

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And what happened is although he disclaimed any interest or rights in those proceeds, he ultimately received benefit in one instance. \$350,000 passed directly through his account. And all of that money then went back to his attorneys in the form of attorneys' fees in violation of the terms of the testamentary trust of Virginia Carol Kennedy's will through which all of those monies passed.

THE COURT: And I'm aware of that. You set that out all very clearly in the pleadings. So I've read that. But what I really want to deal with now because it just bears on the trial continuing is how Mr. Sears would exactly be a witness now. And I understand you're avowing here this is not some strategy to make Mr. Sears a witness and disrupt the defense -- is that you believe in good faith he now is a witness.

MR. BUTNER: That's correct.

THE COURT: I want to address specifically and objectively -- I want to start with the insurance question first if we can. What I heard was, basically, some type of chain of custody thing. I'm not making any decision now on that ultimate issue.

But as far as potential involvement as a witness by Mr. Sears, what I'm hearing is some type of chain of custody thing or notary, which I think the rules contemplate. If an attorney has that involvement, that doesn't require disqualification. Isn't that the law?

MR. BUTNER: That's half of it. And the other half of it is the fact that Mr. Sears knew when that disclaimer was executed that those monies were going to end up coming full circle back to Mr. Sears on behalf of Mr. DeMocker. So it's two things.

THE COURT: Again, if there were a decision that that evidence would be admissible, I think that would be able to be established, if you will, by documentation records other than what would be needed from testimony from Mr. Sears.

MR. BUTNER: The only thing that -- it's a hearsay problem that can be stipulated around, so to speak, in terms of Mr. Sears and the disclaimer.

The problem that is not a hearsay problem is the fact that in doing this Mr. Sears knew that this was being done on behalf of Mr. DeMocker in order that those monies could be paid in the form of attorneys' fees to Mr. Sears and the law firm of Osborn and Maledon.

THE COURT: At the outset you're saying?

MR. BUTNER: At the outset.

THE COURT: Why don't we just stay with just that point if we can before we go to the other witnesses and the --

MR. BUTNER: Pardon?

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THE COURT: You brought two aspects of how Mr. Sears might be a witness.

MR. BUTNER: He was also involved in the resignation of the trustee for the testamentary trust in terms of the documents being executed in that regard in order that this transaction could be facilitated with the payment of these attorneys fees. The trustees starting out to be -- it was first A.G. Edwards, Wachovia and James DeMocker, those two trustees. They were cotrustees, resigned, and then Katie DeMocker became trustee in the testamentary trust in addition to being the personal representative of the estate. She then resigned and

the defendant's girlfriend, Renee Girard, took over as trustee before the last payment of those insurance proceeds was made. And Mr. Sears was involved in that subsequent designation of Renee Girard as a trustee.

THE COURT: That's related to the issue I want to stay with now. I don't want to talk about the anonymous email now. I want to stay just with the insurance issue. Call it that.

Anything else on that before I hear from Mr. Sears?

MR. BUTNER: I think that's it in summary.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sears or someone from the defense would address just that, not the anonymous email.

MR. SEARS: I would begin by pointing out, Your Honor, in the disclosure in which I'm once again disclosed as a witness, they don't say anything about my alleged roll in the handling of these insurance proceeds. It is simply about the anonymous email, voice-in-the-vent story. Just point that out.

Let me just start by saying this, Your Honor: If the state is saying here in open court with the Yavapai County attorney here present that

the lawyers in this case for Mr. DeMocker have committed some criminal act or some unethical act, don't tiptoe around it. Just say it.

If they are here, essentially, saying that we were somehow part of some scheme to defraud somebody, Hartford insurance company or anyone else, say it right now. Before I go any further, I would ask the Court to invite the state to say what they mean.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, have you said what you mean so far?

MR. BUTNER: Of course I have, Judge. If I had intended to accuse Mr. Sears of something, I would do that on the record. That is not what I am saying. The documents speak for themselves in this regard with the exception of Mr. Sears's knowledge at the outset when this disclaimer was executed that those funds were going to be funneled back to him and Osborn Maledon, just as the records indicate.

THE COURT: And I have to say I thought we were primarily going to be talking about the anonymous email issue right now.

MR. BUTNER: To clarify that, Judge, the reason that Mr. Sears hasn't been identified as a witness concerning these insurance proceeds is we just got

these documents and we haven't had opportunity to identify him as such. That's why I thought it was appropriate that I bring that to the Court's attention at this time and as clearly obvious in the time line and factual basis that we have set forth in our motion at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears?

MR. SEARS: I think that's a good place to begin, Your Honor. Let's talk about why all of this information that the state has just now three months into the trial in this case decided to disclose is so wildly and outrageously untimely that it should be precluded on that basis.

The state has given you information which they had in their possession that in the summer of 2008 before charges were brought against

Mr. DeMocker that Mr. DeMocker had made inquiry about his insurance policies. The state has provided a chronology of intercepted jail calls -- by the way, all of which have been preclude by prior orders of Judge Lindberg from this case but three of them. But they have nonetheless continued to provide a chronology of precluded jail calls of Mr. DeMocker in an effort to show that they have just now come to the realization on the prosecution

side what happened to the money.

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We will talk in a bit about one particular call and one particular assertion about when the state says they first became aware of this and the fact that they claim that Hartford insurance company was lying to them about the payment of these benefits as recently as April of this year.

Here's what this looks like to us, Your Honor: You can see perhaps from what you've read that there was a pattern of conduct by the state that escalated in 2010 beginning the first part of February, latter part of January, in which they began to realize they were going to trial in just a few months and escalated their investigation and disclosure. And I think those facts just speak for themselves.

And as they were late disclosing information, we were filing motion after motion to preclude them. And there were a series of rulings from Judge Lindberg which granted us almost every time the relief we were requesting from precluding late disclosed evidence where there was no showing of due diligence by the state that would support the late disclosure of this information.

The most significant part of that was the

disclosure violations that caused Judge Lindberg to strike death penalty allegations, leaving the state with one remaining aggravator going forward in this case, as a sanction for their failure to disclose.

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What concerns us over the last couple days, Your Honor, at a time when we think you should be doing what you need to do to be ready to resume the trial as quickly as possible and when we should be doing what we need to do to resume the trial, the state has interjected this new set of issues, not only issues relating to late disclosure, but issues for the first time pointing at us as lawyers in this case as somehow bad actors in this case, potential witnesses in this case.

We think that it is a pretty clear and rather naked attempt on the part of the state to distract the Court at a time when the Court needs to be focusing its full attention on something else.

And so I make that observation, and I think the facts support it.

Nonetheless, the record shows that the state knew much about the status of these insurance policies. The probate filings of the estate of Carol Kennedy were public record. They were obtainable and obtained by state months and months

ago. The state really is hanging their hat on one contact from Sergeant Boelts, who is also in the courtroom here, with a representative of Hartford in April of this year in which the document filed today from the Court says that -- let me read you what they said here.

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What they say here today is that on

April 22, 2010, Lieutenant Boelts contacts Hartford
life, is advised that Hartford has not paid death
benefit premiums for Virginia Carol Kennedy. And it
cites a supplement. This is what the supplement
stays. It's Supplement 161. On 4/22/10 I spoke
with Nancy Frogstad, a representative of Hartford
life insurance. She did confirm that prior to
making the application for the death benefits on
August 21, 2008, Steve DeMocker did make a phone
call to The Hartford and did ask about disclaiming
the proceeds to his daughters. This information was
contained in the notes portion of their file on the
case.

That's what the report says, Your Honor.

It does not say what the state's summary says. It says nothing about Hartford telling

Lieutenant Boelts that they had not paid death benefits. That's just not in the report. And

that's concerning to us that the state will provide something to the Court in an effort to persuade the Court to a position that cites to the disclosure in this case in an utterly incorrect and incomplete way.

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We're getting so far afield from what we need to talk about here, Your Honor, to get ready to resume the trial in this case that I really don't know where to begin again. But I will say this:

The question of the Hartford insurance company and handling of the proceed is -- and this late disclosure and attempt to interject these new issues is so utterly late that no twisting and stretching of Rule 15.6 could ever, we think, permit or support its admission in this case. It's sanctionable conduct. The rule is clear about that. And that is our concern.

The distraction factor is obvious. Here we are when we should be talking about other things, as you said, related to getting this case on track to resume the trial, we're here talking about these other matters that are out of bounds.

The question of where the money came from to pay the lawyers in this case we think is utterly irrelevant. We're not terribly comfortable talking

about these matters here in open court. If the Court wants to hear more information, we would suggest removing to chambers on the record and continuing the discussion there.

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But our response to it generally is so what. So what about anything related to where the money came from to pay Mr. DeMocker's lawyers in this case. The state, I think, understandably desperately wants to get that information in front of the jury because they think somehow it would smear the defense lawyers in this case with the idea of blood money, that this was Carol Kennedy's life insurance proceeds and that it is outrageous that the defendant's defense was funded somehow by this money. And they provided disclosure checks from this money.

There is a long, complicated, detailed and in the end totally reasonable explanation that involves other lawyers who are not part of the case but have now been dragged in as witnesses. It involves probate laws, probate proceedings, trust law, the handling the money, bank records, the 400 pages of bank records we were given at 7:00 o'clock last night in this case.

It has created a false issue in this

case. We think that part of your decision to preclude this as being late can also include reasonably and should include a simple finding that under 401, 402 and probably most particularly 403, this subject matter, the question of where the life insurance proceeds ultimately landed is irrelevant and if admitted would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant balanced against no probative value.

The question of how the family chose to fund the defense in this case or part of the defense in this case is not a matter that is probative of any fact necessary to determining whether Steven DeMocker killed Carol Kennedy. It is not a fact that is relevant in any context.

It is simply an effort on the part of the state to dirty up not only the defendant but the defendant's family and ultimately the defendant's lawyers in the eyes of the jury. I think that's a sufficient basis for this court to end this discussion now and go no further.

There are many troubling aspects about the way in which the state has proceeded with this case. One of them is that in a response filed, that you have in front of you, they have talked about a computer search that has to do with life insurance

proceeds.

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That computer search was precluded by

Judge Lindberg. The state cannot provide a date for

it. There is an order. It is unambiguous, and the

state knows that. But that has not stopped the

state from seeing if they can sneak that into the

record again.

So between absolute misrepresentations like the one I read you from Lieutenant Boelts's own departmental report and use of precluded phone calls in the summary and the use of this precluded computer search here, a cynic would look at what the state's doing as an effort to see if they can run things by you that they know perfectly well they never could have gotten by Judge Lindberg if he were still presiding in this case.

And we think that is a big problem. If that's the way the case is going to be litigated, then we're going to spend more time out of court litigating these issues. And the state has now suggested they want you to reconsider issues notwithstanding the body of law, talking about the law of the case created by Judge Lindberg's rulings.

That's the way this is going proceed

rather than a reasonable resumption of the evidence, reaching a conclusion and the a verdict by this jury. That's where we see this heading, Your Honor. And it's very, very troubling. Just the fact that I've now spend 20 minutes up here talking about this is a pretty good example, I think, of the intended effect that the state had to distract the Court and derail the process that yesterday was moving in a pretty orderly fashion towards an early resumption of the trial.

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So I would encourage the Court to simply preclude as untimely all of this information. The state can make no showing -- no truthful showing of due diligence in their failure to discover facts that were easily known to them from public records and from due diligence with Hartford months and months and months ago and to find that regardless of whether it's timely or not, it is so utterly irrelevant and so subject to a 403 prejudicial effect/probative value analysis that on that basis this evidence has no place in the trial.

It has nothing to do with the crimes charged against my client. It's simply an effort to bring in a collateral matter to smear Mr. DeMocker and his lawyers to the jury.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, if I might?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Butner. One moment. One rule I'm going to put in place right now is if there is any type of a motion to this court, requesting this court, that involves changing or reconsidering a ruling from Judge Lindberg, I actually need to see that at the very outset of the pleading. I need to know before I get started looking at it.

MR. BUTNER: I understand that, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner --

I just want to remind everybody. I want to get this back in focus a little bit. I started out by saying I'm not ready to make rulings on precluding evidence until I see what Judge Lindberg has done and I've seen previous arguments in detail and how those have been handled by the Judge. Keep that in mind.

I'm not going to make a call on a preclusion issue today. However, obviously if this information is precluded, that would remove one aspect of Mr. Sears being a witness.

With that in mind, please go ahead.

MR. BUTNER: Correct, Judge. First of all, I just draw the Court's attention to probate file
No. P1300PPB2008-0202 here in the Yavapai County

Superior Court. That's the probate case number for the estate of Virginia Carol Kennedy. There is absolutely no mention whatsoever in that probate file of the life insurance policies or the proceeds from those life insurance policies. It's simply not there. The public records do not address the life insurance policies in that case number at all.

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Secondly, the first time that the state became aware that the life insurance proceeds were paid was when the defense brought this up and opened the door to this discussion in their opening statement when Mr. Sears said that Mr. DeMocker disclaimed -- he has disclaimed to the life insurance proceeds and those benefits are were paid to the girls, Katie and Charlotte DeMocker.

That came as a significant surprise to the state in light of the fact that we had been advised all along that they haven't been paid. They've been denied. In fact, we have multiple copies of letters of denial from Hartford life insurance company.

Those were all part of the disclosure that had been given to the defense.

Finally, of course, after hearing that we contacted Hartford life insurance company and found out, in fact, those proceeds had been paid. And we

began subpoenaing the records to determine where those proceeds went. And that's when we discovered that, in fact, those proceeds went to the estate in one instance and to the testamentary trust in another instance. And, basically, they were paid to the estate even though there was no contingent beneficiary on the \$500,000 life insurance policy. They were paid to the testamentary trust as the second -- as the contingent beneficiary on the \$250,000 life insurance policy.

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Those proceeds from the life insurance policies were then processed quickly through the testamentary trust in violation of the provisions of the testamentary trust. The provisions of the testamentary trust call for the corpus to not be distributed until the oldest child turns 25 years of age.

The only exceptions for distribution of corpus would be for the education, health or benefit of the minor child or the children since they're not minors.

So this is not some sort of a false issue in this case, Judge. The one aggravating factor that was not stricken by the Court concerning the death penalty was pecuniary gain. After we went out

of that section of this case, there was discussion with the Court about the fact that there is going to be evidence concerning motive in this case. And a lot of the evidence, the significant evidence, concerning motive in this case is about pecuniary gain and it's about the life insurance policies totalling \$750,000.

And the simple fact of the matter is that the jury has a right to know and needs to know that, in fact, even though Mr. DeMocker disclaimed any right, title or interest in those life insurance policies, in one instance those life insurance monies were paid directly into his the account almost immediately after they were received, and in another instance they passed through the testamentary trust of his deceased wife and then ultimately were paid back to his attorneys. And that's the same thing where the other proceeds went directly through his account.

In other words, Mr. DeMocker managed to gain the benefit of those life insurance proceeds after he had killed his ex-wife. And that is something the state is entitled to argue to this jury. It's significant evidence in this case of motive and, of course, of pecuniary gain by the

defendant.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, you've listed a number of attorneys now as potential witnesses.

MR. BUTNER: Basically, those -- the attorneys as witnesses are to address any hearsay argument about the documents that were being handled at this point in time, Judge. But in Mr. Sears's case, of course, as I stated earlier, it's to demonstrate that he was assisting the defendant and that those monies were going to come back for the defendant's benefit and he knew that at the time.

THE COURT: You're bringing up issues that involve what can properly be done with a trust, things of that nature, listing these people. That would be a potential civil type trial of a month long to get into those kinds of issues. I'm just -- are you suggesting that that -- you think that might head in this proceeding?

MR. BUTNER: No. I don't see that happening at all, Judge. I think it's a rather straightforward proposition. The monies were paid by the insurance company. They were paid in April of 2009. One of the payments was in the hands of Mr. DeMocker's attorneys by August of 2009 after having passed through the testamentary trust.

And then the other payment -- actually it was -- the monies came in approximately at the same time, basically, on the same date in April of 2009. That would be one check for \$254,000 and the other check -- I think it was about 500 and some thousand dollars.

One went into the estate. The other went into the testamentary trust. They then both were in the testamentary trust. They were paid out of the testamentary trust. The first one was paid out -- they actually were paid out in two separate checks, one for 354. And that went out to the account of Katie DeMocker. And from Katie DeMocker's account it then went back to the account of Janice DeMocker. And from Janice DeMocker it then went to the defense attorneys. That took place in August of 2009.

The other payment remained in the testamentary trust account. And then there was the substitution of trustee to the defendant's girlfriend, Renee Girard. And those monies were transferred directly into Steven DeMocker's account -- \$350,000. And then those monies then went to the account of Janice DeMocker. And from Janice DeMocker then they went to Mr. DeMocker's

attorneys.

So it was a fairly direct path. And clearly for the benefit of the defendant and clearly after he had disclaimed any right, title or interest to those monies.

And the jail recordings that were mentioned by defense counsel -- those recordings, although they may have been precluded on other bases, become highly relevant at this point in time and should be allowed because they demonstrate the argument that took place between Steven DeMocker and his daughter Katie DeMocker and the discussion that took place between Steven DeMocker and Renee Girard as to moving \$350,000 and how Steven DeMocker controlled all of these monies from inside the jail house by virtue of his contacts with Katie DeMocker telephonically and Renee Girard telephonically and in person.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears, if you want to say something briefly about this. Because I'll tell you right now my plan had been to really look into trial transcripts, look at witnesses and what has been testified so far. I was going to request if the state could provide the anticipated witnesses, the next few, so that I could really target anticipated

testimony there and be familiar with prior rulings.

And now we're into a whole different matter. And I just haven't read enough. I know there is a great -- I'm assuming that the documents relating to this specific issue were in this supplement here -- the attachments.

Is that right?

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MR. BUTNER: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears, as I said, so you know where I'm at with that.

MR. SEARS: Let me just point out a couple things that I think may help the Court address your concerns. The phone calls were precluded not on other grounds. They were precluded because they were late disclosed. So that is very different than saying they were precluded on separate independent evidentiary bases.

They were simply precluded because they were part of this massive late disclosure in the spring -- the late winter and spring of 2010.

The Court is right. The aspects of this case the state is raising about the probate of Carol Kennedy's will, in which Katie DeMocker was the person represented by Christopher Kottke, whom I think the Court may know, independent counsel

representing them, and the transfers, I think,

demonstrate a couple things. I think they

demonstrate pretty clearly that the state -- and

it's understandable because Mr. Butner is a criminal

prosecutor -- has a very limited knowledge of

probate law. But there is nothing at all untoward

about a testamentary trust being administered

outside of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court

knows that. The will had a pour over provision so

that the money that went, as I understand it, into

the estate poured over into the testamentary trust.

It was subject to the dispositive provisions of the

trust.

I think the Court also would understand we could have days of testimony that would support this. But I think the conclusion will be that the decision to make modifications to the dispositive provision of the trust ultimately is in the discretion of the trustee. And I think Mr. Kottke can demonstrate how that was handled. And it is not a difficult matter. It is not an unusual matter to make such modification. The state's sort of bold assertion that something was done in direct violation of the express wishes of Carol Kennedy is simply not supported by what the evidence would be.

It would take us a long time to get to the bottom of that evidence.

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Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Wilson, with whom I'm sure the Court is also familiar, were retained on a coverage question to determine whether or not there was a basis for Hartford declining coverage. And my role, which is what started this whole discussion, as a notary public was simply because I saw Mr. DeMocker on a regular basis. And unless the state is disputing this, I am a notary public in the state of Arizona. And I don't think it's too difficult to imagine why it was more convenient for me to take documents prepared by other people and have Mr. DeMocker sign them in my presence and me notarize them.

I didn't hear a suggestion from the state that there is something improper about my acting as a notary public in this case, thank goodness.

And that's the sum total. The rest of this matter -- at some point we will have to address this, Your Honor, because these are serious allegations. I think if the state were correct, which I know they're not -- but if the state were correct in these assertions, it would impact on not just my ability to continue to represent them but by

inference Mr. Hammond and Miss Chapman and their firm from participating in this case.

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These are serious allegations being rather lightly tossed around by Mr. Butner. And while I accept his representation that if he were going to accuse me of something bad, he wouldn't do anything but say it, nonetheless here we are. There is some suggestion there is something improper in the way all this was handled.

It will take a very long time to flesh that out. But the answer will be that nothing improper was done. Ultimately it's not only that. It's nothing was improperly done in an area that has no relevance to this case. That's really the point of this, that what was done with this money and how it was used, how the lawyers were paid or not paid is not a matter that has any place in the trial of this case. It's simply not a fact that the jury needs have in front of them to make a determination about whether Steven DeMocker killed Carol Kennedy or not.

It has all of the glamour and glitz that the state wants to as ascribe to it but none of the substance.

THE COURT: I'm going to direct that the

parties submit to me anything else on this issue. I categorize it as the insurance issue. We all know what we're talking about. I want simultaneous filing and to have that by noon on Monday.

And since I'll be in the Verde on Monday,

I want it -- you know, that's the other thing.

Everything is going to go through Division 6. I

want to do that in this matter so the JA here

receives everything and I don't miss something

between the two districts. But I want that emailed

to me or faxed to me in the Verde by Monday on this

issue.

If there is anything more even today, because now I will be focusing on this immediately. And unfortunately I'll have to probably delay getting through some of the transcripts.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, to clarify, should this be emailed to you or to Robin?

THE COURT: Well. Thank you. Robin. Let's leave everything there and have it go that way rather than have anything track over to the Verde at all. Thank you.

I was going to indicate that I thought the trial probably -- I thought I could make my 19.5 findings, both of them, the question of prejudice to

the parties, and then also the preparedness. I thought I could make the ruling on the prejudice to the parties and then, basically, announce that I thought we could resume the trial on Thursday, next Thursday.

I'm less confident on that after this morning. But just to give you an idea of what I was thinking, that's what I had thought the way things were going. I've read the evidentiary summaries, the transcripts of those rulings. And I thought I had a pretty good background in the more significant evidentiary issues and I could look at the transcripts and we could get started.

Mr. Butner, I still would like to ask if the state can do this. Can you give me -- I know -- I believe Sergeant Huante was on the stand.

MR. BUTNER: Correct, Judge.

THE COURT: I know that's where the trial would pick up. But can you give me the next three or four anticipated witnesses?

MR. BUTNER: I can, Judge. And we'll email that to this division before the end of the day. We have put that together, and I don't have that with me at this moment. But we will do that before the end of the day.

1 THE COURT: Okay. At this time I'm going to confirm what I had said to the jurors. They will be 2 3 calling in on Tuesday evening to see about resuming on Wednesday. They could have been told on Thursday at that time. But we will be having at least a 5 telephonic status conference before Tuesday 6 7 evening. Let's put it that way. We're going to 8 touch base on this again. You may have to set a 9 specific hearing, oral argument on the question of 10 Mr. Sears being a potential witness. That just may 11 need to be the next thing that's addressed. Mr. Butner, anything else you want to 12 13 discuss? MR. BUTNER: Nothing further at this time, 14 15 Judge. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Sears? No, Your Honor. We're just 17 MR. SEARS: 18 interested in getting this trial resumed and trying to avoid anything that would interrupt or delay that 19 20 process. Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Then we will be in 22 recess. 23 (The proceedings concluded.) 2.4 25

1	STATE OF ARIZONA)) ss: REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	COUNTY OF YAVAPAI)
3	I, Mina G. Hunt, do hereby certify that I
4	am a Certified Reporter within the State of Arizona
5	and Certified Shorthand Reporter in California.
6	I further certify that these proceedings
7	were taken in shorthand by me at the time and place
8	herein set forth, and were thereafter reduced to
9	typewritten form, and that the foregoing constitutes
10	a true and correct transcript.
11	I further certify that I am not related
12	to, employed by, nor of counsel for any of the
13	parties or attorneys herein, nor otherwise
14	interested in the result of the within action.
15	In witness whereof, I have affixed my
16	signature this 12th day of July, 2010.
17	Mis S. Hunt
18	MINA G. HUNT, AZ CR No. 50619
19	CA CSR No. 8335
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